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I. INTRODUCTION
LUDDITES BEWARE: advances in modern technology maywarrant the reevaluation of Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) regulations that practically serve only to impede the tech-
nological growth within, and the subsequent evolution of, the
aerospace industry. Our capacity to tear through the skies at su-
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personic speed has existed since the 1940s.1 To put that in per-
spective, supersonic flight technology emerged alongside feats
of the era such as: seventeen-cent gallons of gas, Ferrari’s first
sports car, and the invention of both Tupperware and Velcro.2
In the following seventy years, supersonic flight technology im-
pacted the aerospace industry at an ironically languid pace. Sev-
eral factors account for the apparent grounding of our
supersonic capabilities, including health and safety risks, eco-
nomic viability, and the sonic boom.3 Additionally, in March
1973, the FAA enacted regulation that effectively prohibits civil
supersonic flight within the United States.4
In recent news, however, President Donald J. Trump pro-
claimed December 17 to be national Wright Brothers Day, prais-
ing the very spirit of innovation and imagination that could
make America “boom” again.5 President Trump’s proclamation
stated that, “[m]ore than a century after conquering flight, the
Wright brothers continue to motivate and inspire Americans,
who never tire of exploration and innovation. This great Ameri-
can spirit can be found in the design of every new supersonic jet
and next-generation unmanned aircraft.”6 Juxtaposing this
“American spirit”—which ostensibly continues to fuel explora-
tion and innovation—with the FAA prohibition’s stagnating ef-
fect within the aerospace industry might reveal an internal
dichotomy or tension among those values that supposedly de-
fine the American spirit.7 How can exploration or innovation be
valued or practiced in the face of prohibition? Further, is prohi-
bition fundamentally antithetical to those values?
Admittedly, these questions point to the FAA’s regulation of
supersonic flight as the univariate cause of its demise when sev-
1 Nola Taylor Redd, Breaking the Sound Barrier: The Greatest Moments in Flight,
SPACE.COM (Sept. 29, 2017, 11:43 PM), https://www.space.com/16709-breaking-
the-sound-barrier.html [https://perma.cc/6L3Q-K7UC].
2 See generally 1940’s Important News and Events, Key Technology Fashion and Popu-
lar Culture, THE PEOPLE HISTORY, http://www.thepeoplehistory.com/1940s.html#
tech [https://perma.cc/LM4F-TBKF].
3 See generally NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, COMMERCIAL SUPERSONIC TECHNOLOGY: THE
WAY AHEAD 1 (2001), https://www.nap.edu/read/10283/chapter/3 [https://per
ma.cc/BB8C-GEAP].
4 14 C.F.R. § 91.817 (2018).
5 Proclamation No. 9686, 82 Fed. Reg. 60671, 60671 (Dec. 15, 2017).
6 Id.
7 Compare id. (celebrating American ingenuity, innovation, and exploration—
specifically noting the design of new supersonic aircraft as an example of such),
with 14 C.F.R. § 91.817 (prohibiting civil supersonic flight).
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eral factors are responsible.8 This comment ultimately argues
that outright prohibition by the FAA on civil supersonic flight is
overly burdensome and, for all practical purposes, obfuscates
technological evolution within the aerospace industry. In light
of modern technological developments that promise to mitigate
sonic boom nuisance, reevaluation of the FAA prohibition’s ne-
cessity—especially when balanced against the benefits of poten-
tial regulatory alternatives—might reveal a clog in the
inadequately maintained regulatory machine. To that end, the
lack of literature evaluating the FAA regulation’s merits since its
inception in 1973 is surprising.9 In an endeavor to explore this
regulatory landscape this comment first provides background in-
formation regarding supersonic flight. Second, this comment
analyzes the FAA regulation’s enactment and continued merit.
Finally, this comment explores alternative proposals to the FAA
regulation.
II. BACKGROUND: SONIC BOOMS, THE ERA OF
PROHIBITION, AND THEORY IN PRACTICE
Information specifically regarding sonic booms—an inherent
obstacle to civil supersonic flight—serves as the touchstone for
this comment’s analysis. Evaluating the FAA regulation’s contin-
ued merit demands considering the sonic boom, corresponding
litigation, and empirical observations of past civil supersonic
transportation.
A. SONIC BOOMS: DOWN TO A SCIENCE
In October 1947, against the backdrop of the Mojave Desert,
Air Force Captain Chuck Yeager rocketed through the previ-
ously impenetrable sound barrier at speeds in excess of 700
8 COMMERCIAL SUPERSONIC TECHNOLOGY: THE WAY AHEAD, supra note 3.
9 For a comprehensive list of law review articles citing § 91.817, see Michael
Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 370 n.88 (2008) (citing § 91.817 to illustrate a current imped-
iment to supersonic travel and illustrating the necessity for market entrants to
spend money on marketing and lobbying); Brian E. Foont, American Prohibitions
Against Gambling In International Aviation: An Analysis of the Gorton Amendment
Under the Law of the United States and International Law, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 409, 419
n.40 (2000) (citing § 91.817 for the proposition that the Concorde “is only per-
mitted to operate in and out of the United States pursuant to a waiver of the
noise regulations for those aircraft.”); Thomas Lundmark, Systemizing Environmen-
tal Law on a German Model, 7 DICKINSON. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 35 n.187 (1998)
(citing § 91.817 as a corollary to the Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of
1979 for “control and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic booms.”).
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miles per hour.10 Modeled after a .50 caliber bullet and pro-
pelled by four rocket engines, Yeager’s Bell X-1 research plane
was a feat of technological innovation.11 While the groundbreak-
ing flight achieved supersonic speed for only twenty seconds,
the significance of the occasion was marked by a thunderous
clap left in the plane’s wake—the first sonic boom.12
Sonic booms inextricably result from supersonic flight.13 Su-
personic flight, past Mach 1.0, is achieved at speeds of around
760 miles per hour at sea level, with the requisite speed decreas-
ing as altitude is increased.14 Not unlike the way a river flows
around solid and stationary objects within its banks, sonic
booms are created through the fluid-like displacement of pres-
surized air molecules by objects traveling at supersonic speeds
(or speeds equivalent to or greater than Mach 1.0).15 This dis-
placement does not solely occur at the time that the sound bar-
rier is penetrated but continues for as long as the object remains
in supersonic flight.16 Thus, traveling at supersonic speeds gen-
erates a continuous boom that tails the aircraft’s flight path.
The magnitude of a sonic boom is influenced by “not only . . .
the size, shape, and weight of the airplane, but also [by] the
speed and altitude of flight.”17 “A larger and heavier aircraft
must displace more air and create more lift to sustain flight
. . . .”18 Comparatively, then, heavier planes generate more pow-
erful sonic booms than lighter and smaller aircraft. Additionally,
the design of the aircraft creates variances in sonic boom
strength, with “fatter and more blunt” planes generating
stronger shock waves than longer, slender planes such as the
Bell X-1 flown by Captain Yeager.19 Altitude also significantly im-
pacts perception of sonic booms at ground-level because greater
flight altitude results in greater distances traveled by the shock
10 Redd, supra note 1.
11 See id.
12 Id.
13 William F. Baxter, The SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1968).
14 Commander Walter J. Murphy, Sonic Boom—More Annoying Than Dangerous,
1957 JAG J. 3, 3 (1957).
15 NASA Armstrong Fact Sheet: Sonic Booms, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
https://www.nasa.gov/centers/armstrong/news/FactSheets/FS-016-DFRC.html
(last updated Aug. 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/UCV9-WMZ4].
16 Baxter, supra note 13.
17 Id. at 4–5.
18 NASA Armstrong Fact Sheet: Sonic Booms, supra note 15.
19 Id.
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wave.20 Moreover, the concentration of air molecules dissipates
as altitude increases, thereby creating sonic booms that are pro-
gressively weaker with higher origination points.21 Although
greater speeds do correlate to greater sonic boom strength, the
change in magnitude is relatively insignificant after speeds of
Mach 1.3.22 Instead, in-flight maneuvers more significantly im-
pact sonic boom magnitude.23
B. MEASURE TWICE, CUT ONCE: QUANTIFYING THE BOOM
Sonic boom magnitude is measured in “overpressure,” related
in pounds per square foot (PSF).24 Simply put, overpressure is
“[t]he difference between the highest pressure experienced”
and the normal atmospheric pressure.25 According to NASA,
overpressures of one PSF are unlikely to cause any structural
damage.26 Moreover, tests have demonstrated that structures
without pre-existing physical defects remain undamaged in the
face of 11 PSF overpressures.27 To put these values into context,
the Concorde—flying Mach 2.0 at a relatively low altitude of
50,000 feet—generated an average overpressure of only 1.94
PSF.28 When Commander Walter J. Murphy wrote his comment
on sonic booms in 1957, no shock wave had been measured in
excess of 33 PSF.29 However, in an experiment testing sonic
booms generated from low-altitude supersonic flight, the Mc-
Donnell Douglas F-4C Phantom II military fighter bomber gen-
20 Id.; see also Baxter, supra note 13, at 4 (“As it passes through the air, a shock
wave gradually loses its energy because of air friction, and, if it travels far enough,
the overpressure declines until the shockwave disappears.”).
21 NASA Armstrong Fact Sheet: Sonic Booms, supra note 15.
22 Id.
23 Baxter, supra note 13, at 16–23; Anthony J. Ortner, Sonic Boom: Containment
or Confrontation, 34 J. AIR L. & COM. 208, 213 (1968) (“Any form of aircraft accel-
eration, lateral, longitudinal or normal, can cause extreme focusing of the sonic
boom.”). Note, however, that while in supersonic flight, the aircraft will ordina-
rily move in a straight line. “Therefore, serious magnifications of shock-wave
strengths caused by turning probably will not constitute a major problem.” Bax-
ter, supra note 13, at 22.
24 NASA Armstrong Fact Sheet: Sonic Booms, supra note 15.
25 Baxter, supra note 13, at 3–4.
26 NASA Armstrong Fact Sheet: Sonic Booms, supra note 15.
27 Id.; see Murphy, supra note 14, at 4 (“If plaster were in such bad condition
that the vibration from the next passing truck or strong gust of wind would cause
it to fall, it is conceivable that sonic boom could ‘trigger’ its falling. But most of
the damage which has been attributed to sonic boom in claims presented to the
Navy, Air Force, aircraft corporations, and insurance companies is fantastic.”).
28 NASA Armstrong Fact Sheet: Sonic Booms, supra note 15.
29 Murphy, supra note 14, at 4.
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erated overpressures up to 144 PSF.30 The plane flew with a
ground clearance of only 85–125 feet (in contrast to normal
flight altitudes of at least 30,000 feet) and at speeds ranging
from Mach 1.11–1.3.31 Although the experiment generated
overpressures astronomically more intense than those created in
typical supersonic flight, the resulting damage was surprisingly
minimal. Structural damage was nominal: findings were limited
to glass breakage, plaster cracking, and loose items falling off of
shelves.32 Human responses indicated that no “observable symp-
toms of temporary hearing loss” occurred, despite some ringing
of the ears and momentary discomfort.33 The exposures con-
firmed that “no direct injury [was] incurred from exposures to
exceedingly intense sonic booms by healthy young and middle
aged persons.”34 In addition to this study, empirical observations
from the 1957 National Aircraft Show, where one plane made a
supersonic pass at an altitude between 200–1,000 feet, demon-
strate that on the extreme end sonic boom damage may result
in broken glass; falling items; and cracked plaster, concrete, and
chimneys.35
While these findings demonstrate that extreme sonic boom
shock waves pose only a nominal physical threat to persons or
property,36 the more significant problem caused by the booms
relates to their noise. “Nuisance noise generated by a commer-
cial supersonic jet’s sonic booms during cruise, and by its power-
30 See C. W. Nixon et al., Sonic Booms Resulting from Extremely Low-Altitude Super-
sonic Flight: Measurements and Observations on Houses, Livestock and People, AERO-
SPACE MED. RES. LABS. (Oct. 1968).
31 Id. at 8.
32 Id. at 18.
33 Id. at 19.
34 Id.
35 Murphy, supra note 14, at 4.
36 Id. (“If a sonic boom produced by aircraft at an altitude of under 1,000 feet
can cause only glass damage, it is inconceivable that much damage could result
from one produced by an aircraft at higher altitudes. Naval aircraft seldom, if
ever, fly at supersonic speed below altitudes of 30,000 feet over, or adjacent to,
land areas.”). Accord Ortner, supra note 23, at 211–12 (“[D]amage normally oc-
curs at stress points within a structure. Built in stresses due to drying out of green
lumber, hydration of concrete, and poor quality of workmanship create a poten-
tial failure of building materials.”); LAWRENCE R. BENSON, QUIETING THE BOOM:
THE SHAPED SONIC BOOM DEMONSTRATOR AND THE QUEST FOR QUIET SUPERSONIC
FLIGHT 13 (2013), https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/Quietingthe
Boom-ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/57AZ-UEAF] (“There were more than 50 in-
cidents of sample windows being broken at 20 psf to 100 psf but only a few possi-
ble breakages below 20 psf, and there was no physical or psychological harm to
volunteers exposed to overpressures as high as 120 psf.”).
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ful engines at takeoff and landing, has kept the speedy aircraft
from entering service in the United States.”37 For example, the
Concorde created sonic booms with an average perceived deci-
bel level (PLdB) of 105.38 By comparison, making supersonic
travel reasonable over U.S. land would require a reduction in
noise levels to around 65–85 PLdB.39 To test public reaction to
extended sonic boom exposure, a joint task force led by the
FAA, the Air Force, and NASA subjected Oklahoma City re-
sidents to eight sonic booms per day for over six months.40 By
the end of the six-month test (nicknamed Operation Bongo II),
only a quarter of the 3,000 adults interviewed reported that the
noise was so obstreperous that they could never learn to accept
it.41 “Substantial numbers of residents reported interferences
with ordinary living activities and annoyance with such interrup-
tions, but the overwhelming majority felt they could learn to live
with the numbers and kinds of booms experienced during the
six month study.”42 In addition to the anthropocentric focus of
Operation Bongo II, studies have also measured the reaction of
livestock to sonic boom noise.43 Ultimately, however, results of
37 Jim Banke, Sonic Boom Heads for a Thump, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE AD-
MIN. (May 8, 2012), https://www.nasa.gov/topics/aeronautics/features/sonic_
boom_thump.html [https://perma.cc/ZX4K-MHVK].
38 Id.; Eli Dourado, How to Legalize Supersonic Flight Over Land, ELI DOURADO
(Dec. 16, 2016), https://blog.elidourado.com/how-to-legalize-supersonic-flight-
over-land-deefff2dbdce [https://perma.cc/SET7-MS2S]. According to perceived
decibel level comparison charts, noise from the Concorde’s sonic boom is
roughly analogous to standing within three meters of a fully operational power
saw. See Decibel (Loudness) Comparison Chart, GALEN CAROL AUDIO, https://www
.gcaudio.com/tips-tricks/decibel-loudness-comparison-chart/ [https://perma
.cc/VA3H-S4ZG].
39 See Dourado, supra note 38. While NASA is currently working to produce
supersonic aircraft that produce noise levels at or under seventy decibels,
Dourado argues that booms of 85–90 decibels ought to be tolerated; sonic booms
of 85–90 decibels would be 300 times quieter than those created by the Con-
corde. See Dourado, supra note 38.
40 Paul N. Borsky, Community Reactions to Sonic Booms in the Oklahoma City Area,
NAT’L OPINION RES. CTR. 1, 1 (Jan. 1965), http://www.norc.org/PDFs/publica-
tions/NORCRpt_101.pdf [https://perma.cc/XPE6-FD7F] (“A total of 1253 sonic
booms were actually generated in the Oklahoma City area over a period of six
months, from February to July 1964. The intensity of the booms was scheduled
for 1.5 pounds per square foot (PSF) for most of the study and 2.0 PSF during
the latter stage.”).
41 Id. at 2. General annoyance, however, ranged from a minimum of 25% to a
maximum of over 75%. Id. at 4.
42 Id. at 1.
43 See Nathalie M. Armas, Military Aviation Noise and Its Effects on Domesticated
and Wild Animals, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 367 (2004).
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various tests have been inconclusive since different species of
livestock respond to booms in different manners.44 “Ten thou-
sand chickens subjected to the entire six month Oklahoma City
test sustained some or all of the following effects: disorientation
neurosis, loss of feathers, stoppage of egg laying, internal bleed-
ing and death.”45 “Only 4,000 of the original 10,000 chickens
remained alive at the end of the period.”46 In contrast, “the milk
yield of dairy cows in an area of frequent sonic booms was simi-
lar to other cows not exposed.”47 This highlights the importance
of ecological considerations regarding the impact of sonic
booms and the feasibility of supersonic travel over the United
States. In fact, authorization to exceed Mach 1.0 under subsec-
tion (b) of the prohibition typically requires an environmental
assessment and finding of no significant impact.48
Finally, regulation of airport noise must be considered in ad-
dition to the general annoyance of sonic booms. The Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT) and the FAA are both regulatory
entities responsible for the oversight of aircraft design and oper-
ation, including noise abatement.49 Vested with the authority to
regulate aircraft noise and sonic boom, the FAA enacted regula-
tions such as 14 C.F.R. § 36—a comprehensive and exclusive
noise standard regulation regarding aircraft type and certifica-
tion of airworthiness. Essentially, the FAA regulates the maxi-
mum noise emissions that an aircraft may produce by reference
to different “stage” designations.50 The FAA’s stage designations
are adopted from those of the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization (ICAO), a United Nations agency.51 The stages range
44 Id. at 377 (“Animal responses can depend on the animal’s hearing ability,
the duration of the noise, the type of habitat, time of day and year, the activity the
animal is engaged in at the time of exposure, sex and age of the animal, level of
any previous exposure, and whether other physical stresses are present.”).
45 Ortner, supra note 23, at 212.
46 Id.
47 Armas, supra note 43, at 380.
48 Environmental Impacts: Policies and Procedures, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,526,
55,547 (Oct. 13, 1999).
49 Richard W. Danforth, The Airport Noise Abatement Powers of the Federal Govern-
ment and Airport Owners: The FAA’s Checklist, 5 SUM AIR & SPACE LAW. 3, 4 (1990);
see also 49 U.S.C. § 44715 (2012).
50 Details on FAA Noise Levels, Stages, and Phaseouts, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/noise_emis
sions/airport_aircraft_noise_issues/levels/ (last updated Nov. 29, 2016) [https:/
/perma.cc/2Q7F-3EX6].
51 Eli Dourado & Samuel Hammond, Make America Boom Again: How to Bring
Back Supersonic Transport, MERCATUS CTR. 1, 28 (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.mer
2018] CIVIL SUPERSONIC FLIGHT 687
from one to five with one being the noisiest and five being the
most conservative threshold for noise emissions.52 As technologi-
cal capacity to mitigate noise production evolves, new aircraft
are increasingly required to meet stricter thresholds in order to
be certified for airworthiness.53 Likely due to the outright prohi-
bition on civil supersonic flight, Section 36 does not mandate a
standard under which new supersonic jets are to be certified.54
Current supersonic jets are required to operate only at stage two
or better; however, as of 2018, new subsonic jets will be required
to meet stage five noise levels after the FAA adopted the ICAO’s
more stringent standards.55 Thus, it appears unlikely that new
supersonic aircraft will be able to receive airworthiness certifica-
tion at stage two noise emission thresholds.56 Buttressing that
prediction, a 2008 policy statement from the FAA and DOT de-
scribed the latest noise limit at the time as stage four, “which
applies to the development of future supersonic airplanes oper-
ating at subsonic speeds.”57 Therefore, newly designed super-
sonic aircraft will likely be required to meet the noise standards
of a community in which they have been woefully absent for sev-
eral decades. While the FAA’s regulations wholly preempt the
field of airport noise as to non-federal authorities, the “proprie-
tary exception” allows airport owners to determine the accept-
able level of noise created by aircraft operation.58 Owners are
free to refuse use of their airports to operators of loud aircraft.59
Thus, the inherent noisiness of supersonic travel is like a gravita-
tional force—constantly grounding the enterprise fighting to re-
main in the sky.
catus.org/system/files/mercatus-dourado-supersonic-transport-v1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/AKT9-NWRE].
52 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 36.1(f)(1)–(14) (2017).
53 Details on FAA Noise Levels, Stages, and Phaseouts, supra note 50 (“As noise
reduction technology matures, the FAA works with the international community
to determine if a new stringent noise standard is needed. If so, the international
community through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) em-
barks on a comprehensive analysis to determine what that new standard will
be.”).
54 Dourado & Hammond, supra note 51.
55 Id.; see Details on FAA Noise Levels, Stages, and Phaseouts, supra note 50.
56 See Dourado & Hammond, supra note 51, at 28–29.
57 Civil Supersonic Airplane Noise Type Certification Standards and Operating
Rules, 73 Fed. Reg. 62,871, 62,872 (Oct. 22, 2008) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts.
36, 91).
58 Danforth, supra note 49, at 3.
59 Id.
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C. SONIC BOOMS AND YOU: LITIGATION AND
THEORIES OF LIABILITY
The propensity of sonic booms to cause structural damage
necessarily makes them a source of litigation. Experts, however,
are at odds regarding the extent of that propensity. For exam-
ple, the Oklahoma City test results suggest that sonic booms did
not significantly damage any of the local test houses.60 The FAA
rigged test houses with instruments to measure the sonic booms’
physical impact on the various properties.61 Despite the results
of the test, however, 40% of those surveyed believed that their
houses had been damaged, indicating that individuals who be-
lieve sonic booms cause property damage are more likely to
complain and report damage or annoyance.62 In addition to the
Oklahoma City tests, the low-altitude sonic boom test generating
overpressures between 108 PSF and 144 PSF found similarly ex-
pected results:
Observed structures in the exposed residential areas consisted of
very old frame and brick buildings in poor states-of-repair and
both old and new campers and trailers . . . However, the build-
ings and their states-of-repair probably are representative of the
kinds of structures that may be expected in other remote areas
selected as sites for future low-level supersonic flight programs.
Damage to structures was principally confined to glass breakage,
plaster cracking and furnishings falling from shelves. In almost
all cases glass breakage occurred at the side of the building fac-
ing the approaching aircraft. The extent and nature of the dam-
age was not unexpected for the magnitude of the sonic boom
exposures experienced. There was no damage in the trailers.
. . .
A relatively new station wagon located 50 feet from the track in-
curred no breakage throughout the tests, although covers for the
dome light and spare tire compartment popped out during sonic
boom exposures. An already cracked safety glass window (side
rear) of an older Sandia station wagon was shattered by the first
sonic boom to which it was exposed.63
Therefore, these studies suggest that structural damage from
sonic boom exposure is mostly insignificant but can be consider-
ably exacerbated by latent defects already existing in the prop-
60 Borsky, supra note 40, at 5.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Nixon et al., supra note 30, at 18.
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erty. Note, however, that low-altitude supersonic passes are
unusual and overpressures as high as 144 PSF rarely occur
outside of military testing or blatantly negligent flight operation.
In one South Carolina case, plaintiff homeowners brought suit
against their insurance company after sonic booms allegedly
caused their plaster to crack and wood trim to separate from the
wall.64 Despite the damage to the interior of the house, all win-
dows remained intact.65 Plaintiff’s injuries were ultimately attrib-
uted to constructional defects in the home after expert
testimony described sonic boom functionality and the manner
in which damage might be caused by them.66 The court found
that it simply would not have been possible for a sonic boom to
cause interior damage without contiguously causing the home’s
windows to shatter.67 Thus empirical observations and scientific
governmental studies seem to support polemics denying the
dangers of sonic booms.
In contrast to these studies’ conclusions, recent law review ar-
ticles and litigation reports posit that structural damage can be
more severe than previous studies indicated.68 The American
Bar Association cites Alexander v. Firemen’s Insurance Co. as the
first case where considerable structural damage resulted in liti-
gation.69 There, the plaintiff constructed a metal frame building
free of any perceivable imperfections, structural defects, or dete-
rioration.70 After what one witness described as the loudest sonic
boom ever, the shock waves “unseated the girders beneath the
building and capsized it.”71 For those harboring doubts about
gobbledygook governmental science, support for inculpating
sonic booms came in the form of a twisted and mangled Texas
warehouse. Another case of destruction from sonic boom shock
waves involved an almost-completed control tower in Montgom-
ery, Alabama.72 The control tower was a well-constructed mono-
64 Stratton Hammon, More on Sonic Booms: Litigation Is Showing Their Propensities,




68 See generally Ortner, supra note 23, at 211–13; Robert D. Batson, Torts - Liabil-
ity - Sonic Boom, 36 J. AIR L. & COM. 117 (1970); Hammon, supra note 64, at 1096.
69 Hammon, supra note 64, at 1097.
70 Alexander v. Firemen’s Ins. Co., 317 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex. App.—Waco
1958, no writ).
71 Id. at 753.
72 Hammon, supra note 64, at 1097–98.
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lith of reinforced concrete, steel, and aluminum ribs.73 A
supersonic aircraft passed by the tower at only 500 feet, shatter-
ing windows, twisting the aluminum ribs, and completely rip-
ping off aluminum spandrels—“bolts and all.”74 The damage
was so extensive, and so clearly caused by the passing aircraft,
that both parties to the action agreed to stipulate that a sonic
boom caused the damage.75
The divergence in authority regarding the extent to which
sonic booms are capable of causing significant property damage
illustrates the complexities permeating sonic boom litigation.
For example, expert witnesses often may have different theories
of causation stemming from antipodal perceptions of sonic
boom propensities.76 The following paragraphs explore poten-
tial claims that plaintiffs might bring after being exposed to
sonic booms. But there remains difficulty in proving—or dis-
proving—a causal relationship between a sonic boom’s occur-
rence and the ultimate harm asserted by a plaintiff.
The most apparent claim for a plaintiff to bring after suffer-
ing loss from sonic boom exposure is negligence. Simply put,
claims of negligence must prove duty, breach of duty, causation,
and harm.77 Calling back to the variables mentioned earlier re-
garding sonic boom magnitude, the negligent act might be any-
thing from flying too fast or too low to executing in-flight
maneuvers at supersonic speed.78 To prove causation, the plain-
tiff must convincingly establish that the sonic boom’s overpres-
sures were the proximate cause of the harm alleged.79 In light of
the previously described controversy among experts, the plain-
tiff must shoulder the heavy burden of proving that the sonic
boom was the “‘substantial factor’ which caused the damage to
his property.”80 As an example of such difficulty, Batson cites
Dabney v. United States.81 The case stands for the proposition that
mere evidence of damage, without more, is insufficient to prove
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1098.
75 Id.
76 Compare Borsky, supra note 40, with Hammon, supra note 64.
77 Martindale v. Ripp, 629 N.W.2d 698, 707 (Wisc. 2001).
78 Batson, supra note 68, at 122 (“The altitude of flight is significant, since the
energy of a shock wave is diminished by the friction created in its passage
through air. At lower altitudes, shock waves produced by supersonic flight are not
sufficiently dissipated . . . .”).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 123.
81 See id.
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causation in an action for negligence.82 Plaintiffs’ testimony that
they noticed cracks, distortion of windows and doors, and buck-
led hardwood floors ultimately failed to overcome the defen-
dant’s suggestion that all such damage was merely a result of the
building settling over the years.83 In United States v. Gravelle, the
Tenth Circuit wrestled with this very problem.84 There, nine
homeowners from the Oklahoma City area subjected to the gov-
ernment testing in Operation Bongo II brought claims against
the government for property damage caused by sonic booms.85
The government argued that causation could only be proven by
expert testimony that solely relied on scientific data and further
demanded that all other possible sources of causation be elimi-
nated.86 The Tenth Circuit rejected the government’s argu-
ment, holding that the plaintiffs ought not be held to a standard
of proof “impossible for them to sustain under the circum-
stances here imposed on them by the deliberate acts of the gov-
ernment.”87 Ultimately, the court decided that the standard of
proof was met where the plaintiffs’ experts posited that the dam-
age was likely caused by the sonic booms, considering the home-
owners’ account of their properties’ history.88
In addition to proving that the overpressures caused the
claimed damage, plaintiffs must establish that those overpres-
sures were negligently produced.89 This constitutes a heavy bur-
den because most plaintiffs are not in a position to discern “the
exact reason for production of the damaging overpressures.”90
Two possibilities exist for such plaintiffs: the doctrines of res
ipsa loquitur and strict liability.
Res ipsa loquitur—Latin for “the thing speaks for itself”—is a
doctrine through which negligence may be inferred from the
surrounding facts and circumstances of the case.91 “The
factfinder may infer that the defendant has been negligent
82 Dabney v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 599, 600 (W.D.N.C. 1965).
83 Id.; Batson, supra note 68, at 123.
84 United States v. Gravelle, 407 F.2d 964 (10th Cir. 1969).
85 Id. at 965.
86 Id. at 968–69.
87 Id. at 969. In fact, the court took note that the government denied the exis-
tence of any property damage that could be proven under traditional rules of
causation after exposing the plaintiffs’ property to “a deliberate tort” in order to
appease their curiosity as to what damage, if any, would result. Id. at 968.
88 Id. at 969.
89 Batson, supra note 68, at 123.
90 Id.
91 53 TEX. JUR. 3d Negligence § 108.
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when the accident causing the plaintiff’s harm is a type of acci-
dent that ordinarily happens as a result of the negligence of a
class of actors of which the defendant is the relevant member.”92
Thus, where plaintiffs are incapable of determining the cause of
the damaging overpressures, res ipsa loquitur might neverthe-
less provide those plaintiffs with some relief. Applying the doc-
trine in the context of blasting, the Austin Court of Civil Appeals
stated: “If a person in, say, blasting stumps sets off an explosion
which levels his neighbor’s house several hundred feet away, it
would be rather ridiculous to require proof of the exact amount
of explosive used in order to show that he used too much.”93 By
analogy, where supersonic flight causes a sonic boom that sets
off a shock wave causing structural damage to a plaintiff’s prop-
erty, it would be equally ridiculous to require the plaintiff to
prove the exact cause of the damaging overpressure.94 The ulti-
mate applicability of res ipsa loquitur turns on whether the
plaintiff can establish that damaging overpressures are the natu-
ral and ordinary result of negligent supersonic flight or flight
maneuvers.95
Strict liability offers another potential solution for sonic boom
plaintiffs. Under traditional tort liability the plaintiff bears the
92 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 17 (AM. LAW INST.
2010). Note that the third restatement’s construction of the res ipsa loquitur doc-
trine eliminates the “exclusive control” element, found in earlier restatements.
The exclusive control element required the plaintiff’s harm to be caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant. Compare
id. with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (AM. LAW INST. 1965). The
third restatement’s formulation of the res ipsa doctrine thus circumvents Batson’s
worry that convincing a fact-finder that the damage-producing shock-wave was
within the defendant’s exclusive control might be “troublesome.” See Baston,
supra note 68, at 125.
93 McKay v. Kelly, 229 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin, 1950), aff’d,
223 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1950).
94 Furthermore, the plethora of factors affecting overpressure magnitude is
likely to leave the plaintiff in an even more precarious position than those plain-
tiffs in blasting cases:
Not only is the plaintiff confronted with the problem of providing
evidence to show the aircraft’s altitude and flight path and to estab-
lish in fact who was operating the aircraft; but, complete prepara-
tion in sonic boom damage litigation requires knowledge involving
several highly technical sciences, such as aerodynamics, the theory
of flight, principles of jet propulsion, jet engines, aircraft struc-
tures, radar principles, communications and electronics, meteorol-
ogy, navigation, stresses, building codes, manufacturing processes,
and so forth.
Batson, supra note 68, at 124.
95 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 17.
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cost of damage unless he is able to show fault. In some instances,
however, strict liability may attach where a defendant engages in
abnormally dangerous activity.96 Previously referred to as “ul-
trahazardous activity,” abnormally dangerous activities are those
that create a foreseeable and highly significant risk of harm de-
spite the exercise of reasonable care—not activities of “common
usage.”97 A strong argument exists for sonic boom classification
as “abnormally dangerous” because sonic boom magnitude is
dependent on several factors that cannot be controlled, even
with exercise of the utmost care.98 Thus, strict liability can offer
plaintiffs a method to recover damages resulting from sonic
boom shock waves without proof of fault. Furthermore, explo-
sions—defined as a “sudden release of great pressure accompa-
nied by noise”—are commonly considered abnormally
dangerous activities.99 It can certainly be concluded (or at least
argued to the court) that sonic booms, based on that definition,
ought to be classified as explosions and thus treated as an abnor-
mally dangerous condition.100 However, because application of
strict liability requires that supersonic flight be deemed abnor-
mally dangerous, the theory of liability could potentially be
weakened if it is shown that reasonable care mitigates the dan-
gers of supersonic flight.101 Moreover, “technological develop-
ments may so greatly improve supersonic flight that the
ultrahazardous classification may change.”102
Unfortunately, strict liability is wholly unavailable against the
United States as a defendant under the Federal Tort Claims Act
96 Id.
97 Id. § 20.
98 See Ortner, supra note 23, at 215.
99 Id.
100 However, “courts do not as yet take judicial notice that a sonic boom is an
explosion, hence the fact must be proved.” Ortner, supra note 23, at 215. In fact,
courts have explicitly found the opposite—that sonic booms are a unique phe-
nomenon and cannot rightly be considered an explosion in the “ordinarily un-
derstood” sense of the word. See Hammon, supra note 64, at 1098. It is important
to note that failure of this analogy or classification is not dispositive on the issue
of strict liability—sonic booms may still be considered abnormally dangerous, de-
spite their sui generis qualities.
101 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 20 cmt. b (“Avi-
ation, for example, is potentially quite dangerous; but a jury might believe that
these dangers can usually be averted if the pilot and airline exercise reasonable
care . . . Arguments on behalf of strict liability, then, tend to begin with the
premise that the accident has happened even though the defendant has fully
exercised reasonable care while engaging in the activity.”).
102 Ortner, supra note 23, at 215.
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(FTCA). Because civil supersonic flight is prohibited by 14
C.F.R. § 91.817, it follows that most defendants in sonic boom
litigation are members of the military, regulatory agencies, or
contractors working with the government. The FTCA acts as a
waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity, exposing the
government to liability for recognized causes of action.103 Thus,
plaintiffs who suffer from government negligence have recourse
under the FTCA; unfortunately for plaintiffs in sonic boom
cases, the government cannot be held answerable on theories of
strict liability, or where “there has been no negligence or other
form of ‘misfeasance or nonfeasance.’”104 In Laird v. Nelms, the
Supreme Court held that damage from sonic booms is not ac-
tionable under the FTCA without proof of negligence either in
the planning or operation of the flight.105 In fact, the Supreme
Court’s decision effectively “eliminated strict liability under state
law as a basis for suits against the United States under the
FTCA.”106 The FTCA further complicates things for sonic boom
plaintiffs through the “discretionary function exception.”107
Congress enacted the discretionary function exception to pro-
tect the government from unduly burdensome exposure to lia-
bility.108 The exception shields the government from any claims
based on an omission, exercise, or performance of a discretion-
ary function or duty by any federal agency or employee of the
government, regardless of whether that discretion was
abused.109 For example, in Maynard v. United States, the defen-
dant government’s motion for summary judgment was granted
where the Commander of Strategic Air Command and the Chief
of the Navigation Section decided to conduct supersonic flight
103 See Richard B. Sorenson, Use of the FTCA Discretionary Function Exception in
Sonic Boom and Low Overflight Litigation, 33 A.F. L. REV. 137, 137–38 (1990).
104 Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 799 (1972).
105 Id. at 797; see also 5 AM. LAW OF TORTS § 17:6 Strict or Absolute Liability; Laird
v. Nelms Doctrine (2018) (“[T]he Federal Tort Claims Act requires that negli-
gence be shown and . . . the United States cannot be held liable under the Act on
any theory of strict liability for engagement in ultrahazardous activities.”).
106 Sorenson, supra note 103, at 142. Accord Ward v. United States, 471 F.2d
667, 670 (3d Cir. 1973) (“State laws permitting recovery on a strict liability theory
for extrahazardous activities are not a basis for recovery, under the Act, against
the United States.”), and Abraham v. United States, 465 F.2d 881, 882 (5th Cir.
1972) (“The Court unequivocally held that the [FTCA] does not authorize
claims, suits, or liability based on strict liability for ultrahazardous activity.”).
107 See Sorenson, supra note 103, at 137.
108 Id. at 138.
109 Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2012).
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operations and determined the route selection.110 Despite the
plaintiff’s injury, and regardless of whether or not the route se-
lection was negligently made, the decision fell within the discre-
tionary function exception since “it was an act of a subordinate
taken in furtherance of governmental policy.”111 The discretion-
ary function exception encouraged a notable distinction be-
tween negligent planning (which is protected as a discretionary
function) and negligent operation (which is not protected, and
subject to claims under the FTCA).112 As an example of such a
distinction, the Third Circuit offered the following example:
“ordering an army maneuver is a discretionary function, but the
negligent operation of an army vehicle during such a maneuver
is not. The same distinction is applicable to the operation of
aircraft.”113 Plaintiffs subjected to property damage via sonic
booms are thus denied recovery where proof of operational neg-
ligence—as opposed to negligent planning—is lacking.
D. THE CONCORDE: COMMERCIAL SUPERSONIC
TRAVEL IN PRACTICE
“In theory, there is no difference between theory and prac-
tice. But, in practice, there is.”114
When the Concordes first took commercial flight in January
1976, they represented a culmination of the technological devel-
opments of the twentieth century.115 After Chuck Yeager first
broke the sound barrier in 1947, engineers across the world
raced to develop the newfound aerospace technology into a
110 Maynard v. United States, 430 F.2d 1264, 1265–66 (9th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam); Sorenson, supra note 103, at 142.
111 Sorenson, supra note 103, at 142.
112 See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 42 (1953) (“In short, the alleged
‘negligence’ does not subject the Government to liability. The decisions held cul-
pable were all responsibly made at a planning rather than operational level
. . . .”); Ward v. United States, 471 F.2d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 1973) (“While the
government affidavits here were sufficient to show that the decision to send su-
personic flights through the Pittsburgh air corridor at the critical time was made
in the exercise of a discretionary function, they were clearly insufficient to rule
out the possibility of operational negligence.”).
113 Ward, 471 F.2d at 670.
114 Jan L. A. van de Snepscheut, WIKIQUOTE, https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/
Jan_L._A._van_de_Snepscheut [https://perma.cc/N7QC-APEJ] (last updated
Sept. 26, 2016).
115 This Day in History: January 21, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/this-
day-in-history/concorde-takes-off [https://perma.cc/P5C9-JB9A].
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commercially viable supersonic passenger plane.116 The Con-
corde ultimately seized the day, beginning test flights in 1969
and commercial supersonic passenger flights in 1976.117 Top-
ping out at speeds of 1,354 miles per hour (or Mach 2.04), the
Concorde offered up to 100 passengers the ability to fly from
New York to London in just three hours.118 Today, that same
trip takes between 7.5–8.5 hours.119 In fact, almost all commer-
cial flights today travel at less than half the speed demonstrated
by the Concorde,120 which ought to raise questions about the
pace of technological development within the aerospace indus-
try. Despite the Concorde’s prowess, it failed. While supersonic
commercial travel is theoretically feasible, practical considera-
tions gleaned from the Concorde’s experience offer unparal-
leled insight into the future of the aerospace industry’s
evolution.
The Concorde resulted from a joint operation between the
British Aircraft Corporation and Sud Aviation, a French airline
company.121 It represented more than just a plane: the Con-
corde was a monument to European proficiency, proving that
European countries could “cooperate in complex ventures” and
solidifying their position as leaders on the forefront of aero-
space development.122 Four Rolls-Royce jet engines—the most
powerful engines in commercial flight operation—made the
Concorde’s ludicrous speed possible.123 Each engine produced
a near-incomprehensible 38,000 pounds of thrust, collectively
giving the Concorde a take-off speed of over 250 miles per hour
116 Id. (“In 1962 . . . Britain and France signed a treaty to develop the world’s
first supersonic passenger airline. The next year, President John F. Kennedy pro-
posed a similar U.S. project. Meanwhile, in the USSR, Soviet leader Nikita
Krushchev ordered his top aviation engineers to beat the West to the
achievement.”).
117 Id.; Concorde, BRITANNICA.COM, https://www.britannica.com/technology/
Concorde [https://perma.cc/9ELP-99JV].
118 Concorde, supra note 117.
119 Flight Time New York to London, TRIPIT.COM, https://www.tripit.com/destina-
tions/flight-time-new-york-to-london/ [https://perma.cc/DVA5-5MG9].
120 Airplane Speeds Have Stagnated for 40 Years, MERCATUS CTR. (July 20, 2016),
https://www.mercatus.org/publication/airplane-speeds-have-stagnated-40-years
[https://perma.cc/ZZT3-M6MH].
121 Concorde’s History, AEROSPACEBRISTOL.ORG, http://aerospacebristol.org/the-
story-of-concorde/ [https://perma.cc/8AM5-9LUQ].
122 Concorde, supra note 117.
123 Concorde’s History, supra note 121.
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and a cruising speed of over Mach 2.0.124 Although powerful
and quick, the plane was heavy and the engines required mas-
sive amounts of fuel—over 5,500 gallons per hour.125 Neverthe-
less, British Airways alone flew two and a half million
commercial passengers on the supersonic aircraft and even used
one Concorde to completely circumnavigate the world in thirty
hours.126 Despite its vast abilities, the only scheduled flight
routes for the Concorde were between New York and London
for British Airways and between Paris and New York for Air
France.127 The Concorde’s last commercial flight took place on
October 24, 2003, marking twenty-seven years of civil supersonic
transport between its retirement and maiden commercial voy-
age in 1976.128
Several factors contributed to the Concorde’s demise, includ-
ing the fatal Paris crash in July 2000.129 As the Concorde rock-
eted down the French runway, a piece of metal caused one of
the plane’s tires to explode, subsequently puncturing the fuse-
lage and starting a fire that caused two of the engines to fal-
ter.130 The plane crashed merely sixty seconds after takeoff,
killing all 109 persons on board the plane and four people on
the ground.131 In addition, the September 11, 2001 attacks on
the World Trade Center flattened the market for premium, first-
class air travel, making the Concorde’s rebound from the Paris
travesty all the more insurmountable.132 Vicissitudes aside, the
Concorde ultimately had its wings clipped due to cost and envi-
ronmental concerns.
The development costs of the Concorde ran the UK and
French governments upwards of one billion pounds while the
124 Celebrating Concorde, BRITISH AIRWAYS, https://www.britishairways.com/en-
us/information/about-ba/history-and-heritage/celebrating-concorde [https://
perma.cc/6P8D-ZKFH].
125 Id. The plane weighed over 400,000 pounds (185 tons) and carried nearly
26,300 gallons of fuel. Id.
126 Id.
127 Concorde F.A.Q., CONCORDESST.COM, http://www.concordesst.com/faq.html
[https://perma.cc/GCX9-ZLTE].
128 Celebrating Concorde, supra note 124. The Concorde accumulated “over
240,000 flight hours across 81,000 flights before retiring in 2003.” Dourado &
Hammond, supra note 51, at 10.
129 See David Rose, Doomed: The Real Story of Flight 4590, THE GUARDIAN (May 12,
2001, 9:26 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/may/13/davidrose
.focus [https://perma.cc/NNX8-JCK9].
130 Id.
131 This Day in History: January 21, supra note 115.
132 Concorde F.A.Q., supra note 127.
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production costs flew to the tune of nearly 41 million pounds
per plane.133 Adjusted closer to today’s dollars, total costs were
around $27 billion by the time the Concorde was operational in
1976.134 Additionally, booking a seat on the plane required deep
pockets; standard one-way ticket prices of $7,000 severely under-
cut the population of available consumers for civil supersonic
flight.135 Further, the Concorde’s heavy weight of 185 tons, fuel
consumption of 5,700 gallons of gas per hour, and vociferous
sonic boom illustrate its inefficiency.136 While flying at twice the
speed of sound is undoubtedly an impressive feat, such speed
forced the plane to battle against “considerably more drag than
your standard airplane.”137 The Concorde thus had to consume
a ridiculous amount of fuel—four times the fuel per passenger
of a Boeing 747.138 To ensure a range of over 4,000 miles, the
Concorde had to carry over 26,000 gallons of gas—a significant
factor contributing to the plane’s overall weight.139 Moreover, in
just the plane’s taxi to the runway, the Concorde’s four jet en-
gines would have already consumed as much fuel as the average
car uses in six months.140 As the price of oil increased over the
Concorde’s lifetime, such fuel efficiency simply was not sustaina-
ble and caused “both the prices of tickets and the toll on the
environment to rise precipitously.”141
In addition to monetary concerns, the noise produced by the
Concorde severely limited its use for commercial transport.
Sonic booms from the Concorde could be as loud as 135 deci-
bels but typically fell within the 105–110 range.142 Through
133 Id.
134 Dourado & Hammond, supra note 51, at 12.
135 Dara Bramson, Supersonic Airplanes and the Age of Irrational Technology, THE
ATLANTIC (July 1, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2015/07/supersonic-airplanes-concorde/396698/ [https://perma.cc/CP66-
EPW8].
136 Celebrating Concorde, supra note 124.
137 Steven Overly, The Concorde Failed to Change How We Fly, But It Still Could,
WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innova-
tions/wp/2017/02/13/the-supersonic-flight-that-never-really-took-off-has-landed-
for-good/?utm_term=.8cee5b3abcfb [https://perma.cc/XH7U-X8BC].
138 After Concorde, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 16, 2003), http://www.economist
.com/node/2142593 [https://perma.cc/U9HL-N7RM].
139 Celebrating Concorde, supra note 124.
140 Smithsonian Channel, How the Crash of Flight 4590 Destroyed Concorde’s Mys-
tique, YOUTUBE (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4zeDsSJmc
pM [https://perma.cc/A343-ETXR].
141 Overly, supra note 137.
142 Dourado & Hammond, supra note 51, at 3.
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monitoring its departures and arrivals at Dulles International
Airport, the average departure clocked in at 119.4 PLdB and the
average arrival at 116.5 PldB.143 Because of the sonic boom pro-
duced, nearly half of the Concorde’s potential routes were “off-
limits.”144 “Ozone emissions and atmospheric pollution were the
greatest environmental concerns and turmoil over the loud, dis-
ruptive boom that had the power to break windows were con-
stant contentions.”145 One environmental activist, Richard
Wiggs, created the “Anti-Concorde Project” and lobbied tire-
lessly against the development of commercial supersonic trans-
portation.146 The movement captured a widespread public
sentiment that sonic booms posed significant risks not only to
the environment but also to personal property and peace of
mind.147 Ultimately, Wiggs was successful. The FAA responded
in 1973 by prohibiting supersonic transport over the United
States, and the Concorde was “banned from landing in the
United States altogether . . . .”148 However, in 1976, the Secre-
tary of Transportation responded to pressure from the British
and French governments, and directed the FAA to allow up to
two Concorde flights daily from New York’s John F. Kennedy
International Airport and one daily from Dulles International
Airport for a sixteen-month testing period.149 Because the test-
ing period demonstrated that most of the Anti-Concorde Pro-
ject’s worries were unfounded, regular transatlantic flight
between the United States and Europe took shape until the air-
craft’s retirement in 2003.150
143 Civil Supersonic Airplanes: Noise and Sonic Boom Requirements and Deci-
sion on EPA Proposals, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,406, 28,409 (June 29, 1978).
144 Bramson, supra note 135.
145 Id.
146 Dourado & Hammond, supra note 51, at 12 (The Anti-Concorde Project
was a result of Richard Wiggs’s belief that “the Concorde represented a critical
front line in the battle between technology and the environment.”).
147 See Bramson, supra note 135 (“The move came amid growing concerns that
about the impact of sonic booms over land, including fears that the shock waves
would damage buildings, shatter windows, and create intolerable noise near air-
ports.”); Samuel Hammond, The Return of Supersonic, NISKANEN CTR. (June 19,
2017), https://niskanencenter.org/blog/return-of-supersonic/ [https://perma
.cc/ECE8-AU3T].
148 14 C.F.R. § 91.817 (2018); Dourado & Hammond, supra note 51, at 12.
149 See British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 558 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1977)
(“In Secretary Coleman’s view, a testing period of actual Concorde operations
was an essential prelude to the final decision on the aircraft’s acceptability in the
United States.”).
150 See Civil Supersonic Airplanes: Noise and Sonic Boom Requirements and
Decision on EPA Proposals, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,406, 28,409 (June 29, 1978). Note
700 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [83
The Concorde was polarizing. For some, the plane repre-
sented the pinnacle of technological possibility—a symbol of in-
novation and exploration that inspired awe both in the sky and
at the landing strip.151 For others, the Concorde represented a
brazen disregard of the environment and civil infrastructure, its
sonic booms threatening to rip holes in harmony on the
ground.152 Despite antipodal perceptions of its place within the
aerospace industry, the Concorde flew boldly into the virgin
skies of civil supersonic travel. Its legacy lives on to offer empiri-
cal guidance for those undertaking the development of super-
sonic flight technology. Conquering the Concorde’s
inefficiencies could finally make civil supersonic transportation
a mainstay within the aerospace industry.
III. ANALYSIS: THE PROHIBITION, ITS CONTINUED
MERITS, AND POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES
A. THE PROHIBITION
Congress vested the FAA with federal regulatory authority in
1958 through the Federal Aviation Act.153 The Administrator of
the FAA is empowered to set standards and regulations to con-
trol and abate aircraft noise and sonic boom.154 In 1973 the FAA
issued the regulation prohibiting civil supersonic flight over the
United States.155 The regulation reads: “No person may operate
a civil aircraft at a true flight mach number greater than 1 ex-
cept in compliance with conditions and limitations in an author-
ization to exceed mach 1 issued to the operator under
Appendix B of this part.”156 Rather than impose a noise stan-
dard or threshold, the FAA enacted what essentially amounts to
a speed limit for aircraft—no person may fly at supersonic
speeds.157 The FAA’s stated purpose in promulgating the blan-
that the Concorde had considerable restrictions on its operation—it was still sub-
ject to Section 91.817 and was never permitted to hit supersonic speeds while in
the United States. See id. at 28,420–41.
151 See Dourado & Hammond, supra note 51, at 10.
152 Id.
153 John M. Werlich & Richard P. Krinsky, The Aviation Noise Abatement Contro-
versy: Magnificent Laws, Noisy Machines, and the Legal Liability Shuffle, 15 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 69, 71 (1981). The Act has since been repealed and replaced with provi-
sions in 49 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq.
154 49 U.S.C. § 44715 (2012).
155 General Operating and Flight Rules, 38 Fed. Reg. 8,051, 8,051 (Mar. 28,
1973) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).
156 Id.
157 See id.
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ket prohibition was “to afford the public protection from civil
aircraft sonic boom.”158
Activists such as Richard Wiggs, the founder of the Anti-Con-
corde Project, reinforced the public fear of sonic booms
through dissemination of propaganda.159 In fact, one of the ear-
liest proposed solutions to public fear regarding sonic booms
was to create advertising and access to information about the
relatively insignificant threat that sonic booms posed.160 How-
ever, as the comments in the Federal Register indicate, the pub-
lic largely demanded that the FAA regulate supersonic flight.161
Public commentary to the proposed regulation expressed con-
cern for airport noise levels and the effect of exhaust from su-
personic aircraft on the environment and upper atmosphere.162
In response, the framers of the regulation stated that its underly-
ing policy was to shift the burden of establishing environmental
acceptability from the potentially affected public to the propo-
nent of the disputed action.163 “Reasonable opportunity for the
operators or manufacturers of civil supersonic aircraft to con-
duct sonic boom research is thus provided . . . in the form of
closely controlled authorizations to exceed mach 1 in desig-
nated test areas.”164 Thus, the burden now falls upon propo-
nents of supersonic flight technology to demonstrate its
acceptability.
Despite the blanket prohibition, some commentators urged
that all opportunity for supersonic airworthiness testing be elim-
inated and stated that “no provision should exist for the issu-
ance of an authorization to exceed mach 1 under any
condition.”165 Fortunately, the FAA rejected the suggestion as an
irrational abandonment of emergent technology, and affirma-
tively encouraged environmentally responsible growth.166
158 Id. at 8,051.
159 Hammond, supra note 147.
160 Murphy, supra note 14, at 5 (“[W]e can all engage in . . . word-of-mouth
advertising to pass the word to each other and to the public at large that sonic
boom may be mighty loud and very annoying but is not very damaging.”).
161 See General Operating and Flight Rules, 38 Fed. Reg. 8,051 (Mar. 28, 1973)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).
162 Id.
163 Id. at 8,052.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. (“Further, such research is also necessary to promote exploration and
understanding of the complex interface between technology and quality of life so
that both may be maximized . . . .”).
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In 1975, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pro-
posed a rule that would extend its prohibition on civil super-
sonic flight to the operation of any supersonic aircraft going to
or from an American airport, unless that aircraft complied with
noise requirements set out in 14 C.F.R. § 36.167 The proposal
reflected the EPA’s belief that the noise standards set out in Part
36 ought to apply equally to supersonic airplanes, with no ex-
ception for idiosyncratic design features necessary for flight at
supersonic speeds.168 Finally, in 1978, the proposed rules be-
came effective, requiring all civil supersonic airplanes—except
for the Concorde—to comply with Part 36, at the time meaning
noise levels of stage 2 or better.169 Additionally, the rules pro-
hibit civil supersonic aircraft from “producing sonic booms in
the United States while they are going to or from U.S. airports,
even if the airplane is outside the United States at the time.”170
The FAA passed the provision “to protect the coastal areas of the
United States from sonic boom.”171 Moreover, the 1978 report
addressed the EPA’s goal of uniform consideration regarding
noise emissions, despite subsonic and supersonic distinctions.
The FAA refused to commit itself to permanent future linkage
between subsonic and supersonic noise levels (as desired by the
EPA), but did commit to a hard operational noise limit of stage
2 for all present and future supersonic aircraft.172
In establishing the proposed rules, the FAA considered public
input from both written comments and public hearings.173 The
following areas of public concern served as the primary justifica-
tions for both the prohibition on supersonic flight and the
adoption of the 1975 proposed rules. “By far the greatest num-
167 Civil Supersonic Airplanes: Noise Requirements Submitted to FAA by EPA,
40 Fed. Reg. 14,051, 14,093 (Mar. 28, 1975) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 36,
91).
168 Id. at 14,095.
169 See Civil Supersonic Airplanes: Noise and Sonic Boom Requirements and
Decision on EPA Proposals, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,406 (June 29, 1978) (to be codified
at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).
170 Id. at 28,406.
171 Id. at 28,419.
172 Id. at 28,414 (“The FAA’s goal is not to certificate . . . any future design SST
that does not meet standards then applicable to subsonic airplanes. If it is techno-
logically infeasible to produce such an airplane, the FAA will consider setting a
less stringent standard but in no event will that standard be less stringent than
the noise levels of stage 2. However, the FAA does not believe that it would be
appropriate to establish . . . a permanent future linkage between supersonic and
subsonic noise levels below the stage 2 noise limits.”).
173 See id. at 28,408.
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ber of comments, numbered in the thousands, concerned the
noise and other environmental impacts” of supersonic aircraft
operations. Those comments elucidated the surprisingly vast ex-
tent of aircraft noise permeation and interference with quotid-
ian social activity.174 Many comments noted that civil supersonic
travel burdened more people than it benefitted; only those with
deep pockets could afford to avail themselves of the Concorde’s
potential while many more were adversely impacted by its noisy
hullabaloo.175 Furthermore, many expressed concerns that in-
creased airport noise would deleteriously impact property values
in nearby neighborhoods.176 For example, the Concorde’s PLdB
on takeoff was twice as loud as a Boeing 707, four times as loud
as a 747, and eight times louder than a DC-10.177 Operational noise
aside, a second concern with supersonic transport was its effect
on air quality, ozone depletion, and climate change.178 Lastly,
public commentary indicated deep concern for supersonic
transport’s inefficient fuel consumption.179 The FAA thus had
no shortage of justification for its blanket prohibition on civil
supersonic flight.
Going forward, the FAA noted areas of improvement that su-
personic flight technologies ought to address, including opera-
tional noise levels, balance between subsonic and supersonic
capabilities, and fuel consumption.180 Furthermore, the Con-
corde demonstrated a need to identify a market, tweak plane
design and weight, and muffle the sonic boom.181 To meet air-
worthiness certification, operational noise at takeoff, approach,
and mid-flight must be drastically curtailed, and engineering de-
signs ought to account for that constraint from the beginning.182
Additionally, future supersonic aircraft ought to be designed to
efficiently perform at both subsonic and supersonic speeds.183
174 Id. Aircraft noise impacted a range of dynamic social interactions, including
“family life, . . . the conduct of businesses, the operation of schools and hospitals,




177 Id. at 28,409.
178 Id. at 28,410.
179 Id. at 28,410–11.
180 Id. at 28,413.
181 See generally Overly, supra note 137.
182 See Civil Supersonic Airplanes: Noise and Sonic Boom Requirements and
Decision on EPA Proposals, 43 Fed. Reg. at 28,413.
183 Id. at 28,413–14.
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To mitigate noise at takeoff, optimal aircraft engines are high
airflow and low exhaust; however, to efficiently cruise at super-
sonic speed, a high-exhaust engine is best.184 The fuel consump-
tion of the Concorde represents another obstacle for the
evolution of supersonic flight. With gas prices up by 155% since
2003,185 burning fuel at a rate of nearly 6,000 gallons per hour186
is simply no longer economical. Moreover, the substantial
weight of the Concorde only added to its inefficiency.187 There-
fore, new supersonic aircraft ought to be designed with weight
and fuel efficiency in mind.
B. THE MERITS OF CONTINUED PROHIBITION
AND PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
Despite the FAA’s intention to foster “environmentally re-
sponsible growth” rather than stagnate emergent technology,
supersonic flight has failed to find a foothold in the aerospace
industry in the decades following its prohibition. Supersonic
flight technology has continued to develop, however, and pro-
ponents are becoming vocal about revisiting the possibility of
civil supersonic transport.188 Even the FAA is recognizing tech-
nological progress sufficient to warrant reexamination of its pro-
hibition.189 As a result of computer engineering, simulation
testing, light-weight composite materials, and tweaked airplane
design, the sonic boom has finally met its match.190 Additionally,
evolution of general aerospace technology makes overcoming
the empirical problems with the Concorde much more feasi-
ble.191 With decades to test, develop, and understand the theo-
retical idiosyncrasies of supersonic flight, modern technology
warrants a reevaluation, and possible repeal, of the FAA prohibi-
tion on civil supersonic flight. While research and development
184 Id.
185 Retail Price of Regular Gasoline in the United States from 1990 to 2017, STATIS-
TICA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/204740/retail-price-of-gasoline-in-the-
united-states-since-1990/ [https://perma.cc/Z26Q-XJJU].
186 Celebrating Concorde, supra note 124.
187 See id.
188 E.g., Dourado & Hammond, supra note 51; Airline Speeds Have Stagnated for
40 Years, supra note 120; Banke, supra note 37.
189 See Dourado & Hammond, supra note 51, at 18.
190 See Tariq Malik, Shushing Sonic Booms: Changing the Shape of Supersonic Planes,
SPACE.COM (Apr. 21, 2004, 7:00 AM), https://www.space.com/2992-shushing-
sonic-booms-changing-shape-supersonic-planes.html [https://perma.cc/SSG5-
22WM].
191 See Overly, supra note 137.
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are demonstrating the potential acceptability of supersonic tech-
nology in theory, the practical development of those technolo-
gies in the aerospace industry will require soliciting the FAA for
rule changes.
Sonic booms still pose the biggest threat to civil supersonic
aviation.192 As the most significant obstacle in the path of super-
sonic travel, most developers have spent time researching and
designing aircraft that mitigate sonic boom production.193
NASA, through a joint operation with Lockheed Martin, has
been developing a low-noise supersonic prototype that utilizes
“aerodynamic techniques to achieve smoother pressure changes
to minimize sonic booms.”194 Honeywell claims that it has cre-
ated technology capable of giving pilots real-time feedback of
sonic boom magnitude, thus allowing pilots to visualize and
monitor sonic boom footprints.195 One of the most significant
methods of mitigating sonic boom impact has been redesigning
the shape and profile of aircraft.196 The shape and character of
the sonic boom supervenes on the shape and weight of the air-
craft, thereby allowing researchers and developers to create
“[l]ow-boom, shaped signatures” that reduce annoyance and
eliminate the destructive potentiality of sonic booms.197 “The
two most important breakthroughs have been the invention of
strong but lightweight materials and the use of computer simu-
lations for optimizing aircraft shape to affect the pressure signa-
ture.”198 Specifically, the use of carbon fiber rather than aircraft-
grade aluminum fosters lightweight designs that ultimately dis-
place less air and result in significantly lower overpressures.199
Furthermore, computer software supplants the need for expen-
sive and time-consuming wind-tunnel testing by instead using al-
gorithms to “optimize wing shape, volume and lift distribution,
the impact of thermal exhaust, and so on.”200
192 Commercial Supersonic Technology: The Way Ahead, supra note 3, at 1.
193 See David Reid, NASA and Honeywell Claim They Can Reduce Sonic Booms Over
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The “Quiet Spike” represents one method of using aircraft
shape to mitigate sonic booms. Project Quiet Spike was a re-
search venture by NASA and Gulfstream Aerospace investigating
the mitigation impact of a “24-foot-long lance-like spike” pro-
truding from the front of the plane.201 The spike-nosed design
has caught traction with several supersonic business jet develop-
ers and promises another method of shaping sonic booms into
quieter configurations.202 Aerion Corporation’s AS2 supersonic
business jet is one notable example.203 Texas billionaire and
Fort Worth native Robert Bass serves as the chairman for Aer-
ion, a manufacturer of supersonic business jets.204 In collabora-
tion with Lockheed Martin, the Aerion AS2 supersonic business
jet is designed to travel up to Mach 1.5 over land without creat-
ing the obstreperous boom plaguing supersonic flight develop-
ment.205 In addition to its spiked nose and sleek overall design,
the plane departs from delta-wing design tradition and uses a
thin wing and horizontal stabilizer to reduce friction drag by
70%.206 Aerion’s example illustrates the general technological
development over the last forty years and brings supersonic
flight technology closer to overcoming its inherent noisiness
and sonic boom. While Aerion’s supersonic business jet only has
the capacity to transport around twelve passengers, Denver-
based startup, Boom, is working on a supersonic business jet
that can carry up to fifty-five passengers.207
Another sonic boom mitigation technique is “Mach cutoff.”
When flying at high enough altitudes, the shock waves from su-
personic flight are dissipated into a phenomenon not quite as
loud as the typical sonic boom.208 “The concept is that at speeds
201 Gray Creech, NASA Supersonic Jousting, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.
(Oct. 4, 2006), https://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/improvingflight/supersonic_
jousting.html [https://perma.cc/AHW9-CE7V].
202 See id.
203 Leslie Josephs, A Texas Billionaire Wants to Build a Supersonic Business Jet,
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207 BOOM, https://boomsupersonic.com/ [https://perma.cc/KRV3-ZZ6Z].
208 Larry J. Cliatt, II et al., Mach Cutoff Analysis and Results From NASA’s Farfield
Investigation of No-boom Thresholds, NASA ARMSTRONG FLIGHT RES. CTR. (June 1,
2016), https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20160007349.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2JBC-BZZU].
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of Mach 1.1 to 1.3, the shock wave produced by an aircraft can
be buffered by altitude and weather, resulting in an ‘evanescent
wave’ reaching the ground that ‘would sound much like distant
thunder.’”209 The FAA considered use of Mach cutoff as a miti-
gation device, but ultimately concluded that the operational
procedure was insufficient to unilaterally warrant exception
from Section 91.817.210 The FAA failed, however, to consider
Mach cutoff as a means of circumventing the very problem Sec-
tion 91.817 was addressed at—sonic boom nuisance—and in-
stead used circular reasoning to support its dismissal of the
operational procedure.211
The problem with the FAA’s prohibition on supersonic flight
lies in its overly broad prohibition of flight speeds in excess of
Mach 1.0 rather than a prohibition on sonic booms themselves
or a noise limitation on supersonic flight.212 Section 91.817
serves only to impede tech developers from aiming at a specific
benchmark for sonic boom acceptability.213 Thus, pursuant to
increased information and innovation in aerospace engineering
that dramatically reduces sonic boom intensity, “[t]he ban on
civil supersonic transport overland looks increasingly obso-
lete.”214 Instead, a significant number of authors propose repeal-
ing the FAA prohibition on flying at Mach 1.0 speeds, replacing
it with a supersonic noise standard that is “economically reason-
able [and] technologically practicable.”215 This would provide
developers with a concrete objective in designing socially accept-
209 Memorandum from Lorlelei Peter, Assistant Chief Counsel for Regs., Fed.
Aviation Admin., to Dr. Lourdes Maurice, Exec. Director, Office of Env’t and
Energy, Fed. Aviation Admin., 2016 WL 861763, at *1 (Feb 29, 2016).
210 Id. at *4 (“In no case may the exploitation of the Mach cutoff phenomenon
be regarded as compliance with § 91.817(a), since its use requires a violation of
the terms of the regulation. Neither paragraph of the regulation can be read as
allowing speed in excess of Mach 1 as long as the flight crew believes a sonic
boom produced by the airplane will not reach the ground.”).
211 See id.
212 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.817 (2018).
213 See Andrea O’Sullivan, How the FAA Killed Supersonic Flight—and How It Can
Revive It, MERCATUS CTR. (July 26, 2016), https://www.mercatus.org/expert_com
mentary/how-faa-killed-supersonic-flight-and-how-it-can-revive-it [https://perma
.cc/6999-87UB].
214 Hammond, supra note 147.
215 See, e.g., Dourado & Hammond, supra note 51, at 28; Hammond, supra note
147; O’Sullivan, supra note 213; Jared Meyer, Supersonic Flight: Make America Boom
Again, FORBES (Oct. 28, 2016, 11:16 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
jaredmeyer/2016/10/28/supersonic-flight-make-america-boom-again/
#2f47be371077 [https://perma.cc/3BXH-E9CB].
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able supersonic aircraft. In fact, proposals for acceptable super-
sonic noise standards already exist:
In our view, an initial sonic boom standard should be informed
by noise levels that we already accept in society, accounting for
time and duration of the sounds. Lawnmowers, motorcycles, and
kitchen blenders all operate in the 85–90 dB(A) range and are
widely accepted for sustained durations during day-time hours.
Consequently, we believe this range would also be acceptable for
the short durations of sonic booms. Because decibels are mea-
sured on a base-10 logarithmic scale, 85 dB(A) is 100 times qui-
eter than the Concorde’s nominal boom of around 105 dB(A).
During nighttime hours, we would recommend a noise standard
on the order of another 100-fold reduction. This would place the
overnight noise standard at 65–70 dB(A), a noise level that would
be further dampened by the fact that most people are indoors
during these hours.216
Such a noise limitation would allow supersonic flight technol-
ogy to develop in the marketplace while still affording the pub-
lic protection from the sonic boom noise pollution for which
Section 91.817 was originally enacted.217
Airport noise and fuel efficiency were other significant con-
cerns justifying the FAA prohibition on supersonic flight. While
low-boom concept aircraft have demonstrably mitigated sonic
boom concerns, a shortfall exists in that their design is opti-
mized for supersonic cruise rather than for climb.218 The FAA
noted the future need for supersonic aircraft to balance optimal
flight and noise levels at subsonic and supersonic speeds.219
With the current state of engine technology, supersonic planes
are still most efficient when taking off at maximum throttle.220
Consequently, supersonic engines—in order to maximize fuel
efficiency—will necessarily be somewhat louder.221 However,
modern supersonic aircraft “would be quieter upon takeoff sim-
216 Dourado & Hammond, supra note 51, at 26.
217 See General Operating and Flight Rules: Civil Aircraft Sonic Boom, 38 Fed.
Reg. 8,051, 8,051 (Mar. 28, 1973) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91) (“The pur-
pose of this amendment is to afford the public protection from civil aircraft sonic
boom.”).
218 Dourado & Hammond, supra note 51, at 24.
219 Civil Supersonic Airplanes: Noise and Sonic Boom Requirements and Deci-
sion on EPA Proposals, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,406, 28,413 (June 29, 1978) (to be codi-
fied at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).
220 Dourado & Hammond, supra note 51, at 27.
221 Id.
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ply by virtue of being lighter and having better engines.”222
Thus, supersonic travel would still produce more noise at take-
off than subsonic travel, but would create exponentially less air-
port noise than earlier supersonic aircraft like the Concorde.
Furthermore, the lighter, better engines available for modern
supersonic aircraft also alleviate some concerns about super-
sonic airplane fuel consumption: “Lighter materials and more
efficient engines mean the jet would need to carry less fuel,
which would make its taxiing weight lower. Lower weight means
less thrust is necessary at takeoff.”223 In addition, modern en-
gines are powerful enough to cruise at supersonic speeds with-
out use of afterburners, “which waste fuel and are expensive to
use.”224 For example, Boom’s fifty-five-seat supersonic business
jet is sufficiently light and competently powered as to achieve
takeoff noise better than stage four.225 Thus, the modern devel-
opment of aerospace technology vitiates historical concerns
about supersonic aircraft’s wildly inefficient fuel consumption.
Furthermore, airport noise levels created by modern supersonic
aircraft would be slight in comparison to the din of the Con-
corde, further distancing the relevance of the prohibition’s orig-
inal justifications from the status quo.226
Ultimately, the FAA’s goal of decreasing airport noise is meri-
torious, and the FAA is committed to the continued reduction
in noise pollution.227 But the goals of decreased airport noise
and repealing the prohibition on supersonic flight are not mu-
tually exclusive. In 1978, the FAA declared its hard commitment
to stage two operational noise limits.228 However, in response to
EPA pressure to regulate subsonic and supersonic aircraft
equally, the FAA stated that it “does not believe that it would be
appropriate to establish . . . a permanent future linkage between
supersonic and subsonic noise levels below the stage 2 noise lim-
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 33.
225 BOOM, supra note 207.
226 See Civil Supersonic Airplanes: Noise and Sonic Boom Requirements and
Decision on EPA Proposals, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,406, 28,413 (June 29, 1978) (to be
codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).
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its.”229 One suggested alternative to the blanket prohibition on
supersonic flight balances the advancement of supersonic avia-
tion with the concerns of property owners neighboring airports:
use the current stage three operational limit for subsonic air-
craft as the new standard for airworthiness certification for su-
personic aircraft.230 “These communities already tolerate Stage 3
noise, and new Stage 3 supersonic aircraft would not apprecia-
bly increase noise levels.”231 By mandating compliance with the
status quo, the FAA would not subject airport neighbors to in-
creased noise pollution and would allow practical development
of supersonic technologies over time. Thus, continued prohibi-
tion of supersonic flight would represent an anachronistic con-
tinuation of “[k]nee-jerk techno-skepticism” rather than policy
making warranted by evidentiary considerations.232 Where su-
personic aviation would impose no more noise pollution than is
currently accounted for, the FAA ought to end its punitive
prohibition.
The environmental justifications for prohibition on super-
sonic flight have similarly faltered in the decades since its pro-
mulgation. Richard Wiggs’s Anti-Concorde Project represented
public concern that technological development came at the ex-
pense of environmental sanctity.233 “Ozone emissions and at-
mospheric pollution” represented the gravest concerns of
environmental activists.234 However, those fears were ultimately
demonstrated to be unfounded. After nuclear testing by both
the United States and Soviet Union, large amounts of nitrogen
and other particulates were injected into the atmosphere in an
amount comparable to the flight of 500 Concordes every day for
seven hours, for nearly five years.235 The resulting impact on the
ozone layer was negligible.236 In fact, NASA conducted simula-
tions investigating the environmental impact of burning eigh-
teen million pounds of jet fuel at altitudes greater than 50,000
feet and concluded that the maximum ozone depletion for that
229 Id.
230 Dourado & Hammond, supra note 51, at 29.
231 Id.
232 See O’Sullivan, supra note 213.
233 Dourado & Hammond, supra note 51, at 12 (The Anti-Concorde Project
was a result of Richard Wiggs’s belief that “the Concorde represented a critical
front line in the battle between technology and the environment.”).
234 Bramson, supra note 135.
235 Dourado & Hammond, supra note 51, at 30.
236 Id.
2018] CIVIL SUPERSONIC FLIGHT 711
limited area was only 0.038%.237 To put that in perspective, envi-
ronmental activists were worried about ozone depletion of
20–60%.238 Thus, considering the fuel efficiency and light-
weight design of modern supersonic aircraft,239 environmental
concerns are ostensibly a non-issue for the ultimate analysis of
the FAA regulation’s continued justification.
IV. CONCLUSION
Considering the pace of technological advancement, the FAA
prohibition on civil supersonic flight is anathema to innovation.
Even though the Concorde brought to light significant concerns
about sonic boom nuisance, environmental responsibility, and
economic feasibility, the market for civil supersonic transporta-
tion is riper than ever. Specifically, smaller supersonic business
jets have generated significant interest and overcome most of
the economic inefficiencies that plagued the Concorde.240 The
smaller design and lightweight composite material displaces sig-
nificantly less air (resulting in lower overpressures), use of com-
puter simulations optimizes aircraft shape and design to
mitigate sonic boom impact, modern engines are more fuel effi-
cient than ever, and smaller supersonic business jets are essen-
tially ozone-neutral.241 Because the FAA’s prohibition on civil
supersonic flight is foundationally outdated, the time has come
to repeal and replace the prohibition with regulation that will
allow room for development within the aerospace industry.
Rather than prohibiting supersonic flight as a means to protect
the public from sonic boom, the FAA ought to regulate the end
itself. By establishing thresholds of acceptable noise for super-
sonic aircraft, the FAA can set a benchmark for research and
development, fostering evolution within the aerospace industry
that has been lacking for the last forty years.
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